Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2

Article 22

Spring 1999

1998 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Workers'
Compensation Law
Roger I. Roots
Roger Williams University School of Law

Kevin B. Hylton
Roger Williams University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Recommended Citation
Roots, Roger I. and Hylton, Kevin B. (1999) "1998 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Workers' Compensation Law," Roger Williams
University Law Review: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 22.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol4/iss2/22

This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

816 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605
Workers' Compensation/Indemnification. Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc., 707 A.2d 660 (R.I. 1998). The exclusiveremedy provision of Rhode Island's Workers' Compensation Act
bars suit for work-related injuries not only by an injured employee
against his employer, but also by a third party against the employer of an injured employee who receives workers' compensation
benefits. Only an express indemnification agreement between an
employer and a third party can make the employer liable to the
third party for injuries suffered by its workers'-compensationdrawing employee.
In Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors,' the Rhode Island
Supreme Court found that the Workers' Compensation Act grants
implicit immunity from indemnity actions from third parties, as
well as from direct tort actions from employees.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Daniel Ferguson (Ferguson), was employed by Ajax Construction Company (Ajax).2 He worked for Ajax at a construction project in Dartmouth, Massachusetts, at which Ajax had
subcontracted to provide steel construction services to Bennington
Iron Works (Bennington) on a facility for the Titleist Golf Division
of the Acushnet Company.3 Bennington in turn was a sub-contractor of Marshall Contractors, Inc. (Marshall), 4 the general contractor of the project.5
During construction of the Titleist facility, Ferguson fell
through an opening on a mezzanine deck and suffered severe bodily injuries.6 He began collecting workers' compensation benefits
through the policy of his employer. 7 His attorney also filed suit
alleging negligence on the part of both the general contractor, Mar1.
2.
3.

707 A.2d 660 (R.I. 1998).
See id. at 661.
See id.

4.

Marshall did business as Algonquin Builders and the latter name was

used recurrently in the Rhode Island Supreme Court's first opinion in the case.
See Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc., 644 A.2d 310 (R.I. 1994). By the time
of the more recent decision, however, the court used the name Marshall Contractors almost exclusively, so this survey piece will utilize the same designation.
5. See Ferguson, 707 A.2d at 661.
6. See Ferguson, 644 A.2d at 310.
7. See Ferguson, 707 A.2d at 661.

1999]

SURVEY SECTION

817

shall, and the steel contractor, Bennington.8 Marshall filed a
cross-claim against Bennington for indemnity and contribution. 9
At trial Bennington moved for, and was granted, a directed
verdict after the presentation of Ferguson's evidence.' 0 This left
only Marshall as a defendant at the end of trial; and the jury found
for the plaintiff, returning a verdict against Marshall in excess of
$1 million."
The case first came before the Rhode Island Supreme Court
when Marshall appealed the denial of its motion for new trial and
the granting of a directed verdict in favor of Bennington. 12 After
losing this appeal, Marshall filed a third-party complaint against
13
Ajax on remand, seeking indemnification.
Ajax moved for summary judgment 14 and a hearing justice
granted Ajax's motion pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 The case then reached the Rhode Island Supreme Court again pursuant to Marshall's appeal of the
judgment in favor of Ajax. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The outcome in Ferguson turned on both the exclusive-remedy
provision of Rhode Island's workers' compensation statute and the
principles of contract law. Rhode Island General Laws section 2829-20 provides that a direct employer of an injured employee who
collects workers' compensation benefits is immune from liability
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Ferguson, 644 A.2d at 310 (finding that the granting of a directed verdict in favor of Bennington was justified because Ferguson presented no evidence
that parties other than Marshall could have been responsible for conditions at the
work site).
11. See Ferguson, 707 A.2d at 661.
12. See id. The appeal was denied in Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors,Inc.,
644 A.2d 310 (R.L 1994). The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected both of Marshall's claims, upholding the denial of the directed verdict both because no evidence that Bennington was responsible for the condition of the job-site was
presented at trial and because Marshall had not objected to Bennington's motion
at trial, and finding that the trial judge's denial of a new trial was justified on a
review of the evidence. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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beyond that which is insured for through the program. 17 In 1992,
in Fish v. Burns Brothers Donut Shop, Inc.,' 8 the supreme court
concluded that this exclusive-remedy provision generally bars suit
for indemnification against any employer whose injured employee
has drawn workers' compensation benefits. The drawing of workers' compensation thus acts as res judicata in regard to the issue of
the employer's liability for injuries suffered by a workers'-compensation-drawing employee.
The Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Act establishes a
statutory scheme whereby an employee is "provided with swift,
though limited, relief for all injuries suffered on the job," in lieu of
all other rights and remedies she might have. 19 The legislation
thus serves the ends of social policy; Rhode Islanders avoid the demands of supporting public charges whom have been unsuccessful
in tort claims against their employers for potentially more remunerative damages and the courts benefit from relief from the burden of proving liability.
Marshall justified its indemnification action by claiming it fell
under the "contract" exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of
Rhode Island's Workers' Compensation Act laid out by the Rhode
20
Island Supreme Court in Cosentino v. A.F. Lusi ConstructionCo.
The Cosentino court determined that the state legislature's enactment of a workers' compensation program did not abolish the right
21
of parties to contract around the statute.
17. Section 28-29-20 reads in part:
The right to compensation for an injury under chapters 29-38 of this title,
and the remedy therefor granted by those chapters, shall be in lieu of all
rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law
or otherwise against an employer, or its directors, officers, agents, or
employees.
18. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 (1956) (1994 Reenactment). 617 A.2d 874 (R.I.
1992).
19. Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 582 (D.R.I. 1996).
20. 485 A.2d 105, 108 (R.I. 1984) (finding that a general contractor could obtain indemnity from a subcontractor where an arms-length contract clause expressly provided, notwithstanding the provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act).
21. The court in Cosentino did not base the parties' right to contract around
the workers' compensation statute on the constitution; instead it said that ". . . we
perceive no reason why the expressed intent of the parties in a contract calling for
[indemnification] should not be effectuated." Id. at 107. The court also distinguished an expressed contractual indemnification agreement by saying it is "not
an action based upon the employee's injury but rather is an action for reimbursement based upon an expressed contractual obligation between the employer and a
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Marshall relied on language in a written purchase order executed between Bennington and Ajax which provided for indemnification for Bennington or the owner of the property where the work
was to be performed. 22 Marshall contended that it was a thirdparty beneficiary of the Bennington-Ajax order because it was the
agent of the owner of the property (Titleist).2 3 The court found
that Marshall's claim was not sufficiently supported by contractual
or other documents which indicated Titleist had conferred agency
status on Marshall such that its indemnification rights vis-a-vis
24
Ajax were conferred on Marshall.
Marshall also pointed to its own contract with Bennington,
which provided that Bennington would "indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor [Marshall] . . . from and against any and all
claims, losses, damages, liabilities and the like" formed an umthird-party plaintiff... independent of any statutory duty the employer may owe
an employee." Id. at 108. Some courts in other states have held that constitutional considerations serve to bar an outright prohibition of contractual indemnification agreements. See, e.g., Miami Int'l Merchandise Mart, Inc. v. Gene Somers &
Assoc., Inc., 506 So.2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that Florida's exclusive
remedy provision is unconstitutional to the extent it operates to immunize an employer from a contractual liability); Carlson v. Smogard, 215 N.W.2d 615 (Minn.
1974) (finding that a statutory preclusion of indemnity violates due process rights
under the federal constitution and rights under a state constitutional guarantee of
a remedy for injuries or wrongs).
Interestingly, it seems that the workers' compensation program is itself a contract in which the employee waives his right to maintain a common law action for
his injuries against his employer, and the employer in turn is contractually deprived of certain common law defenses previously available to him. See Mustapha
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890 (D.R.I. 1967). Indeed, Rhode Island's
workers' compensation program is not mandatory for employees but is deemed
only to bind an employee to its provisions "if he or she shall not have given his or
her employer at the time of his or her contract of hire notice in writing that he or
she claims that right [of action at common law to recover damages for personal
injuries] and within ten (10) days thereafter has filed a copy thereof with the director [of the program]." R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-17 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
22. See Ferguson, 707 A.2d 660, 661-62 (R.I. 1998). Marshall also contended
that the Bennington-Ajax agreement made the resolution of the case contingent on
Vermont law because the agreement provided that "[tihe validity, interpretation,
and performance of this order shall be governed by the law of the State in which
this order is issued by Buyer." Id. at 663. Notwithstanding that the BenningtonAjax purchase order was issued in Vermont, the court found that the choice-of-law
provision was inapplicable because Marshall was a nonparty to the agreement and
the indemnification issue was "not answered by the terms of that order or by any
other agreement [between Marshall and Ajax]." Id.
23. See id. at 662.
24. See id. at 662-63.
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brella agreement whose terms were incorporated in the later Bennington-Ajax agreement. 25 The court found that "no
indemnification contract or other such agreement exists between
Ajax and Marshall," 26 and that even the incorporation of terms in
the Ajax-Bennington purchase order could not serve to convert
27
Ajax into an indemnitor of Marshall.
CONCLUSION

In Ferguson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined
that when an employee's direct employer has covered itself
through workers' compensation, that employer is not liable
through common law tort actions in the absence of expressed contractual intent to be bound. Such expressed intent must comply
with fundamental rules of contract law, with an immunity-waiving
employer clearly expressing its intent to be bound to indemnification to third parties.
Roger I. Roots

25. Id. at 662.
26. Id.
27. See id.
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Workers' Compensation. Rison v. Air Filter Systems, 707 A.2d
675 (R.I. 1998). If an employee recovers third party tort damages
through settlement, and subsequently is awarded a specific benefits award under section 28-33-19, these specific benefits are subject to the section 28-35-58 suspension provision.
In Rison v. Air Filter Systems,' the Rhode Island Supreme
Court determined that under sections 28-33-19 and 28-35-58 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, an employee may receive both specific
compensation from an employer based on workers' compensation
and tort damages from a third-party. 2 However, section 28-35-58
provides a suspension mechanism under which an employer's duty
to pay an employee for future workers' compensation may be suspended if the employee recovers from a third-party through a settlement or a judgment on a tort action. 3 In Rison, the court stated
an employee who receives a specific compensation award from his
employer, after recovering from a third-party tort settlement, will
have the specific compensation award subjected to the section 284
35-58 suspension provision.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

James Rison III (Rison) was employed as a sheet metal worker
for Air Filter Systems, Inc. (Air Filter) in March of 1987., On
March 3, 1987, Rison sustained injuries while working for Air Filter.6 As a result of a flash fire of glue, Rison suffered third-degree
burns over fifty percent of his body. 7 Rison suffered permanent
scarring to over seventy-eight percent of his body despite undergoing several surgical skin graft operations. 8 Rison lost between
eleven and sixteen percent of the operation of his upper extremities and his skin was discolored and destroyed. 9
On March 24, 1987, Rison began receiving indemnity payments at a "weekly comp rate" of $244 per week as workers' com1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

707 A.2d 675 (R.I. 1998).
Id. at 679.
See id.
Id. at 684.
See id. at 677.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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pensation.10 These weekly payments served to compensate Rison
for the wages he lost due to his injury."
On November 7, 1991, Rison filed a Workers' Compensation
Court (WCC) petition requesting an extra specific-compensation
award based on section 28-33-19 of the Workers' Compensation Act
(WCA), for his loss of the use of his hands and the3extensive bodily
disfigurement. 12 This petition was never heard.'
On December 1, 1991, Rison engaged in a settlement with
Stanley Bostitch Company (Bostitch). 14 Bostitch, according to
Rison, was at least partially responsible for his injuries. 15 The set6
tlement apparently was in excess of $2.5 million.'
Rison reimbursed Air Filter for the weekly workers' compensation benefits at the amount of $225,312.17 After reimbursing Air
Filter, Rison presented his petition for specific compensation to a
WCC judge based on section 28-33-19.18 The judge decided, based
on all of the evidence, that Rison was entitled to the maximum
statutory award of $52,582 for his injuries. 19 The court considered
whether under section 28-33-19, specific awards would be subject
to the payment-suspension mechanism mentioned under section
28-35-58.20 The court held the specific award was not subject to
the suspension mechanism; however, Air Filter's duty to continue
paying workers' compensation to Rison would be suspended as
stated in section 28-35-58.21 The court held "any award of specific
compensation after a third-party settlement would be paid in full
to the employee without any offset or consideration of the monies
22
which have been paid to him by the third-party settlement."
Air Filter appealed the WCC judge's decision to the WCC's Appellate Division, 2 3 stating it was entitled to set off the specific10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 678.
See id.
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compensation award with the settlement Rison received from its
agreement with Bostitch. 2 4 The Appellate Division ruled in favor
of Air Filter and stated specific compensation given under section
28-33-19 may be suspended by the rules stated in section 28-355
58.2 Air Filter was not required to pay any of these specific-compensation directly to Rison. 26 Rather, the specific compensation
award would suspend Air Filter's duty to pay future workers' compensation benefits to Rison.2 7 Following the Appellate Division's
Court for a writ
ruling, Rison petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme
28
granted.
was
petition
the
of certiorari, and
BACKGROUND

The Rhode Island legislature enacted sections 28-35-58 and
28-33-19 to provide for the control of third-party suits and awards
under workers' compensation statutes respectively. 29 In the event
that a claimant gains a reward from a third party greater than the
amount of support given to date to the claimant by its employer,
the claimant's employer's responsibility to provide workers' compensation support may be suspended for a period of time depen30
dent on the amount of the surplus award.
Specifically, section 28-33-19 provides for the potential award
a claimant may receive from his or her employer based on a workers' compensation action and a method for the determination of a
31
proper compensation plan for the claimant.
Section 28-3-58 allows claimants to bring third party suits to
recover damages and at the same time bring suits for compensation against the employer. 3 2 This statute further states that the
claimant who receives compensation and third party damage
awards must reimburse the person who compensated the claimant
based on workers' compensation award for compensation to the
date of the receipt of damages and provides for a suspension of sec24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at

683.
679.
680.
679.
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tion 28-33-19 specific damages if the damages are awarded after a
33
third party tort settlement.
ANALYsis AND HOLDING

In Rison, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held when an employee recovers damages from a third-party, and subsequently is
awarded a specific benefits award under section 28-33-19, those
specific benefits are subject to the section 28-35-58 suspension
mechanism. 34 Thus, if an employee receives a specific-compensation award from his or her employer, that award "shall be credited
against the excess settlement damages according to the provisions
of section 28-35-58." 3 5 This crediting will reduce a suspension period, required by section 28-35-58, by a period of time to be determined based on the amount of the third-party damages
36
settlement.
The court presented the issue as "whether any specific benefits
awarded to an employee under section 28-33-19 after the employee
has received a third-party settlement of a tort claim are likewise
subject to section 28-35-58's suspension mechanism." 37 The court
noted that under section 28-35-58 a claimant may receive both
damages and compensation. 38 However, "compensation accruing
after the employee has obtained a third-party tort recovery via a
settlement or a judgment [must] be suspended for a length of
time."3 9 The length of this suspension period is determined by
looking at the employee's weekly compensation rate, benefits paid
by the employer to date, and any excess from the third party settlement.40 The court divided its analysis into two primary sections:
first, whether the section 28-35-58 suspension mechanism was intended to include specific-benefits in the definition of "compensation," and second, if specific-benefits fit within the definition of
compensation, whether the suspension mechanism should apply to
41
these benefits.
33.

Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id. at 686.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 678-79.
See id. at 679.
Id.

40.

See id.

41.

See id.
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The court addressed the first question and asked if specific
benefits are a type of compensation under section 28-35-58.42 The
court held "compensation," as stated in section 28-35-58, "includes
all types of compensation available under the WCA-except medical benefits, which are expressly exempted." 43 Rhode Island's
highest court focused on the fact that this section "explicitly excludes medical expenses from the scope of its suspension-of-compensation mechanism.""
Since the Legislature specifically
excluded these medical expenses from the suspension, the court inferred that the Legislature would have mentioned section 28-33-19
benefits had it intended to exempt them from the section 28-35-58
45
suspension provision.
The court found further support for its position that specific
damages are included in the section 28-35-58 "compensation" definition by looking to section 28-33-19. 46 There, the court looked to
the title of the section "additional compensation for specific injuries" and to the first sentence of the section which states that benefits "shall be paid in addition to all other compensation." 4 7 The
court posited that these two sections, which allow for specific damages, suggest these benefits "are just another type of workers' compensation." 48 Thus, the usage of such "inclusive terms" suggests
specific damages were intended by the Legislature to fall within
the section 28-35-58 definition of compensation. 4 9 For these reasons the court held specific damages fall within the definition of
compensation in section 28-35-58.
Next, the court considered whether specific compensation
should be subject to the suspension mechanism of section 28-3558.50 The court looked to other states and their use of similar suspension provisions in workers' compensation contexts. 5 1 Rhode Island's Supreme Court held the General Assembly intended to have
the suspension provision apply to specific damage awards. 52 The
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 682.
See id.
See id. at 681.
See id. at 682.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 683.
See id. at 685.
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court supported this ruling by suggesting that the Legislature intended for two purposes to be realized through the use of section
28-35-58. 53 Specifically, it intended to create "no-fault liability on
the employer's part to benefit and protect the employee" and to allow the employee to "pursue a recovery from alleged third-party
tortfeasors either before or after collecting WCA benefits."5 4 Since
the court felt the Legislature's goals are achieved when specific
damage awards are subjected to the section 28-35-58 provisions for
suspension, the court approved the application of the suspension
55
provision to these specific damage awards.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a claimant who
receives specific-compensation awards subsequent to a recovery of
a third party settlement must be immediately credited with any
set-off against excess-settlement amounts obtained from a third
party in form of reduction of suspension period. The result of the
court's interpretation of sections 28-35-58 and 28-33-19 is an injured claimant who receives a settlement from a third party will
not receive further workers' compensation payments from their
employer in their lifetime. Although the claimant will be barred
from recovery this will prevent from double recoveries by claimants in these positions.
Kevin B. Hylton

53.

See id. at 683-84.

54. Id.
55. See id. at 685.

